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The Conflicting Mandates of FRE 412 and
FRCP 26: Should Courts Allow Discovery of
a Sexual Harassment Plaintiff's
Sexual History?
Ethan A. Heinzt

The expansion of sexual harassment law in recent decades
has afforded greater legal rights and remedies to alleged victims,
but has also prompted defendants to defend accusations ever
more vigorously.1 In litigating sexual harassment suits, defendants often seek to raise issues involving intimate details from
the plaintiff's private life such as her2 past sexual behavior, the
identities of her sexual partners, her use of birth control devices,
and prior incidents of molestation.3 In one recent case, the
"Id]efendants continually sought to make an issue of plaintiff's
sexual history," portraying her as "sexually insatiable, as engaging in multiple affairs with married men, as a lesbian, and as suffering from a sexually transmitted disease.'
Perhaps because sexual harassment cases necessarily involve
such fundamental aspects of human identity as sexuality and
t
2

B.A. 1993, University of Michigan; J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Chicago.
See Parts I A and I B.
The vast majority of sexual harassment plaintiffs are women. In 1992, for example,

approximately 91 percent of persons filing sexual harassment charges with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") were women. Study Finds Sexual Harassment Awards From EEOC Doubled From 1992 to 1993, Daily Lab Rep (BNA) 100, D-9
(May 26, 1994). Accordingly, this Comment will uniformly employ the feminine pronoun to
describe the generic sexual harassment plaintiff, and the masculine pronoun to identify
her harasser. However, male victims of sexual harassment also have a cause of action
under Title VII. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co v EEOC, 462 US 669, 682
(1983). Same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII. Oncale v Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc, 523 US 75, 82 (1998). Consequently, unless otherwise noted, use of
a specific gendered pronoun anywhere in this Comment does not imply that the observation is inapplicable to a person of the opposite sex.
' See generally Ellen Schultz and Junda Woo, The Bedroom Ploy: Plaintiffs' Sex
Lives Are Being Laid Bare in Harassment Cases, Wall St J Al (Sept 19, 1994) (describing
defense inquiries into plaintiffs' experiences with premarital sex and X-rated videos);
Susan Ichinose, Harassment Redux: Sexual Harassment Litigation From the Plaintiffs
Perspective, Hawaii Bar J 11, 11 (May 1996) ("[Slcrutiny of the plaintiffs personal life can
be intense.... [Tihe courtroom can then become as hostile an environment to the plaintiff
as the workplace ever was.").
Rodriguez-Hernandezv Miranda-Velez, 132 F3d 848, 855-56 (lst Cir 1998).
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personal dignity, aggressive defense of a sexual harassment suit
may resemble a second assault on the plaintiff, at least from her
perspective. Within the adversarial framework of American jurisprudence, discussion of such issues can be very unpleasant to
sexual harassment victims, and may distract or bias the finder of
fact.
Aware that the interjection of intimate details into the courtroom may intimidate the plaintiff and distract the jury rather
than further the search for truth, Congress restricted the role
that a sexual harassment plaintiff's sexual history plays at trial.
In 1994, it amended Federal Rule of Evidence ("FRE") 412, commonly known as the rape shield rule, to include civil sexual misconduct.' FRE 412 establishes a presumption against admissibility at trial of a plaintiff's sexual history with any person besides
the defendant.6 However, the amended Rule does not clearly resolve whether the defendant may seek discovery of such evidence
during the pretrial phase of litigation. Because the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") allow discovery of evidence that is
not itself admissible,7 a sexual harassment plaintiff may have to
accede to discovery of intimate details of her private life that bear
scant relation to the case at hand. Accordingly, an aggressive defense attorney may attempt to use discovery to intimidate the
sexual harassment plaintiff.
While acknowledging the usefulness of standards rather than
bright-line rules in balancing the competing interests of broad
discovery with respect for the victim's dignity, this Comment
suggests several measures to make those standards more uniform
and reduce the potential for abusive discovery. Part I introduces
the law of sexual harassment and discovery and explains FRE
412 in greater depth. Part II evaluates the different conclusions
courts have reached in attempting to fill this gap in the law. Part
III explains the need for a more consistent approach to discovery
of sexual history. It demonstrates that defendants normally need
not delve into an alleged harassment victim's sexual history in
order to mount a complete defense. Part IV examines California
practice in search of appropriate analogies and solutions for the
gap in federal law. Finally, Part V recommends both procedural
and substantive remedies.
' Pub L No 103-322, 108 Stat 1919 (1994), codified at 28 USC FRE 412 (1994). The
amended FRE 412 is Title IV, Subtitle A, Chapter 4, § 40141(b) of this Act.
' FRE 412(aXl)-(2); see also notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
7
FRCP 26(bX1); see also note 46.
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I. BACKGROUND: SEXUAL HARASSMENT, RULE 412,
AND DISCOVERY

A. An Overview of Workplace Sexual Harassment Law
Recognition of sexual harassment as a cause of action derives
from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' Title VII forbids an
employer "to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's ... sex."9 In 1976, a federal court first accepted the
argument that conditioning employment upon submission to sexual advances - now commonly known as quid pro quo sexual
harassment - is actionable under Title VII.' ° Four years later,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
promulgated regulations affirming that harassment on the basis
of sex violated Title VII, whether by quid pro quo or through a
sexually hostile work environment."
The Supreme Court cited those regulations in support of its
1986 decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 2 holding
that a hostile work environment suffices to create an actionable
claim of sexual harassment, 3 even without proof of economic

10

Codified at 42 USC §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
42 USC § 2000e-2(aX1).
Williams v Saxbe, 413 F Supp 654, 657-61 (D DC 1976). The Williams decision did

not immediately persuade other federal courts to recognize a cause of action for sexual
harassment. See, for example, Ludington v Sambo's Restaurants,Inc, 474 F Supp 480, 483
(E D Wis 1979) (holding that sexual harassment is not actionable unless it is actively or
tacitly sanctioned by the employer).
" 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1998), which states in full:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of Title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
(footnote omitted). The first and second definitions describe what has come to be known as
quid pro quo sexual harassment; the third definition describes the second recognized form
of sexual harassment, creation of a hostile work environment. The Supreme Court reendorsed the use of such categorization, albeit with some hesitancy, in Burlington Industries, Inc v Ellerth, 118 S Ct 2257, 2264-65 (1998).
12 477 US 57 (1986).
Id at 73.
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harm to the victim.14 The Court also held that the unwelcomeness
of an employer's sexual advances, rather than the voluntariness
of the employee's submission to those advances, determined
whether the employer's actions constituted sexual harassment.15
Significantly, the Court suggested that the employee's workplace
conduct, speech, and dress were "obviously relevant" in determining whether the employer's advances were welcome or not; no
per se rule existed to bar the admission of such evidence."
The Supreme Court has further delineated the law of sexual
harassment in the 1990s. In Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc, 7 the
Court held that a hostile work environment claim did not require
proof of serious psychological injury to the plaintiff, but did require a showing that the harassment was both objectively and
subjectively viewed as hostile under a totality of the circumstances test. 8 A pair of recent decisions, Burlington Industries,
Inc v Ellerth,9 and Faragherv City of Boca Raton," substantially
clarified the issue of employer liability in sexual harassment
cases. In Ellerth, the Court held that an employer is vicariously
liable for a hostile work environment but has an affirmative defense if the victimized employee suffered no tangible job consequences, the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct sexual harassment, and the employee unreasonably failed
to avail herself of opportunities to prevent, correct, or avoid the
harm.2 ' Faragherclarified Ellerth by explaining that the strength
of the affirmative defense depends on the employer's actions to
prevent and correct the harassment, as well as on the extent to
which the victim made use of those preventive or corrective
22
measures.

Congressional action has also influenced the development of
sexual harassment law. In particular, Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, which expanded remedies for violations of
Title VII to include compensatory and punitive damages, not
merely the equitable relief previously available."
Id at 64.
Id at 68.
"
477 US at 69.
510 US 17 (1993).
S Id at 21-23.
118 S Ct 2257 (1998).
118 S Ct 2275 (1998).
21 Ellerth, 118 S Ct at
2270.
Faragher,118 S Ct at 2292-93.
42 USC § 1981a(a)-(b) (1994). The sum of compensatory and punitive damages
available for a violation of Title VII is capped at varying levels between $50,000 and
$300,000, depending on the number of persons employed by the defendant. 42 USC
"
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B. Problems Facing Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs
Raising the stakes in this fashion sparked a predictable increase in the volume of sexual harassment lawsuits filed,24 and, to
many observers, a further decline in the civility of the proceedings. Shortly before the 1994 amendments to FRE 412 took effect,
the Wall Street Journal reported that sexual harassment defendants frequently pursued a "nut or slut" strategy that portrayed
plaintiffs either as hypersensitive and overimaginative, or as
promiscuous and welcoming of the advances.' With the plaintiff
captive on the witness stand, defense attorneys "increasingly resort[ed] to harsh tactics, asking about sex lives, childhood molestation, abortions and venereal disease."2" Their hope, according to
plaintiffs' attorneys, was to coerce the plaintiff to drop her suit or
to settle for an unfairly low amount. 2' These inquiries threatened
not only to intimidate the plaintiff but also to diminish her charactor in the eyes of the jury. Of course, courts could exclude such
evidence as irrelevant or prejudicial under Federal Rules of Evi§ 1981a(b)(3). See also Deters v Equifax Credit Information Services, Inc, 1998 US Dist
LEXIS 266, *1 (D Kan) (jury award of $1 million in punitive damages reduced by court to
$300,000 to comply with statutory cap). Punitive damages may be awarded only upon a
showing that the employer acted "with malice or with reckless indifference." 42 USC
§ 1981a(bX1).
However, it is possible for Title VII plaintiffs to join state tort claims in federal
court (where federal evidentiary and procedural rules obtain) to exceed the Title VII damages cap. In addition, governmental employees who are victims of sexual harassment may
bring suit under 42 USC § 1983 (deprivation of civil rights under color of law) and similar
civil rights provisions rather than under Title VII, thereby avoiding the damages cap. For
an infamous example, see Neil Lewis, Sex Harassment Suit Based on 1860's Law, NY
Times 1-9 (May 7, 1994), and Neil Lewis, Talks Failed to Resolve Clinton Suit, NY Times
1-16 (May 8, 1994) (plaintiff sought $700,000 damages in sexual harassment suit against
governor predicated on §§ 1983 and 1985 as well as state law). Although FRE 412 applies
to "any... civil proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct," FRE 412, this Comment
will focus primarily on discovery in Title VII sexual harassment suits. The Title VII case
law is more developed, and potential solutions are more feasible in this context.
It is impossible to state with certainty the extent to which the expansion of remedies has caused or merely correlates with the increase in lawsuits, but logic suggests that
increasing the expected gain from filing a sexual harassment suit while keeping steady
the costs will prompt an increase in such litigation. Congress expanded the damages remedy to promote private enforcement of the Civil Rights Act, and available numbers illustrate the effect. Requests for right-to-sue notices from the EEOC - a mandatory precursor to filing any Title VII action - increased from 13.3 percent in 1990 to 24.4 percent in
1993. EEOC Study, Daily Lab Rep (BNA) 100 at D-9 (cited in note 2). Similarly, while the
EEOC received 5,623 charges of sexual harassment in 1989, in subsequent years the
numbers rose sharply: 6,127 in 1990; 11,908 in 1993; and 15,889 in 1997. Id at D-9; Michael Delikat and Whittney R. Bradshaw, Special Litigation Issues in Sexual Harassment
Cases: An Employer's Perspective, 587 PLI/Lit 211, 213 (1998).
Schultz and Woo, The Bedroom Ploy, Wall St J Al (cited in note 3) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
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dence 403 and 404,28 but evidently such tactics succeeded often

enough to motivate Congress to create a sexual harassment
shield.
C. Creation of a Sexual Harassment Shield
Roughly concurrent with the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, a movement began to build in Congress to extend rape
shield protection to civil cases.29 Fearing preemption of its traditional domain, the Judicial Conference of the Uhited States ° began work on a similar amendment to Rule 412.31 Although the
Supreme Court objected to the extension of Rule 412 to civil
cases, 32 ultimately Congress did adopt the version propounded by
the Judicial Conference, enacting it as part of the omnibus Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.' In addition, Congress expressed its intent that the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee Notes ("Notes") apply to Rule 412."'
FRE 412 creates a strong presumption that evidence of the
sexual behavior or predisposition of an alleged victim is inadmis"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury." FRE 403. "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible
for the purpose of proving that action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion."
FRE 404.
For a fuller discussion of the legislative history of amended Rule 412, see Charles
Alan Wright and Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., FederalPracticeand Procedure § 6381.1 at 171
(West Supp 1998). See also Note, Proving Welcomeness: The Admissibility of Evidence of
Sexual History in Sexual HarassmentClaims Under the 1994 Amendments to FederalRule
ofEvidence 412, 48 Vand L Rev 1155, 1169-77 (1995).
3'
The Rules Enabling Act endows the Supreme Court with the power to set procedural and evidentiary rules for the federal judiciary. 28 USC §§ 2071-2077 (1994). The
Judicial Conference of the United States is responsible for studying the practical operation
of those rules, 28 USC § 331 (1994), and may appoint special Advisory Committees to
recommend the creation of such rules. 28 USC § 2073(a)(2).
" Wright and Graham, FederalPracticeand Procedure § 5381.1 at 171 (cited in note
29). See also Note, 48 Vand L Rev at 1170-71 (cited in note 29).
Wright and Graham, FederalPracticeand Procedure § 5381.1 at 172 (cited in note
29).
, See note 5. There was no Congressional debate of the sexual harassment shield
provision, perhaps because it was folded into a much larger bill. See Daniel J. Capra,
Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence That May Require Clarification, 182 FRD 268, 292 (1998). Moreover, there was only minimal debate of the bill that
enacted the original Rule 412. Charles Alan Wright and Kenneth W. Graham, Federal
Practiceand Procedure § 5381 at 485 (West 1980). Thus negligible legislative history exists to guide present-day interpretation of the statute.
' The Committee of Conference, which bore responsibility for reconciling disparities
in the House and Senate versions of the bill, published a joint explanatory statement that
provided in part: "The Conferees intend that the Advisory Committee Note on Rule 412, as
transmitted by the Judicial Conference of the United States ... applies to Rule 412 as
enacted by this section." Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, HR
Conf Rep No 103-711, 103d Cong, 2d Sess 383 (1994).
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sible at trial. 5 Specifically, it bars evidence that any alleged victim of sexual misconduct engaged in other sexual behavior as
well as evidence of that victim's sexual predisposition. 6 However,
to safeguard the rights of the defendant, the amended Rule does
allow the introduction of such evidence where "its probative value
substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of
unfair prejudice to any party."37 This balancing test is strongly
weighted against admissibility, in contrast to the general standard of FRE 403, which adopts a presumption of admissibility.'
The Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee, which
drafted FRE 412 in coordination with Congress, 9 cited several
closely related purposes for the amendment. First, the amended
FRE 412 protects against "the infusion of sexual innuendo into
the factfinding process,"4° thus "safeguarding the victim against
stereotypical thinking"41 by a jury inflamed or prejudiced by sexual history evidence of dubious relevance. Second, "[t]he rule
aims to safeguard the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is
associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details."42 In
this fashion, FRE 412 promotes social policy by increasing the
harassment will not be deterred
likelihood that victims of sexual
4
from seeking judicial relief.

D. Rule 412's Silence on the Issue of Discovery
FRE 412 establishes clear standards regulating the admission of evidence of the victim's sexual history, but is ambiguous
as to whether it permits the defendant to discover such evidence.
The Rule itself is silent, but the Advisory Committee Notes to
Rule 41244 admonish that Rule 412's civil protections "do not ap' FRE 412(a)(1)-(2). "While relevant evidence is generally admissible under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403, evidence subject to Rule 412 is presumptively inadmissible, even
when offered to disprove 'unwelcomeness' in a sexual harassment case." Socks-Brunot v
Hirschvogel Inc, 184 FRD 113, 119 (S D Ohio 1999).

FRE 412(a1)-(2).
FRE 412(b)(2).
FRE 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.").
See notes 29-34 and accompanying text.

FRE 412 Advisory Committee Notes.
'
42

Id.

Id.

Id ("By affording victims protection in most instances, the rule also encourages
victims of sexual misconduct to institute and to participate in legal proceedings against
alleged offenders.").
" Although drafted by a panel of experienced federal judges, see 28 USC § 331
(1994), Advisory Committee Notes to evidentiary and procedural rules are not mandatory
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ply to discovery of a victim's past sexual conduct or predisposition
in civil cases, which will be continued [sic] to be governed by Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26"' - a rule that mandates broad discovery even of
evidence that is not itself admissible.46 At the same time, the
Notes advise that:

authority in federal courts. On occasion, the Supreme Court has declined to follow them.
See Libretti v United States, 516 US 29, 41 (1995) (declining to follow a portion of Advisory
Committee's Notes on FRCrP 31, because "t]he Committee's assumption runs counter to
...
weighty authority"); Hohn v United States, 118 S Ct 1969, 1974 (1998) (rejecting a
.suggestion contained in the Advisory Committee Notes on Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 22(b)... [as] [in]consistent with the Federal Rules and the uniform practice of
the courts of appeals"); but see id at 1979 (Scalia dissenting) (citing with approval the
Notes as virtually an "anticipatory refutation of the Court's countertextual holding").
More often, federal courts, including the Supreme Court, treat Advisory Committee
Notes as highly persuasive authority. See Old Chief v United States, 519 US 172, 184-85
(1997) (citing with approval Advisory Committee's Notes to FRE 401 and FRE 403); Williamson v United States, 512 US 594, 614 (1994) (Kennedy concurring) ("When ... the text
of a Rule of Evidence does not answer a question that must be answered in order to apply
the Rule, and when the Advisory Committee's Note does answer the question, our practice
indicates that we should pay attention to the Advisory Committee's Note."). A Note is
especially persuasive where Congress enacted the relevant Rule with the interpretation
expressed in the Advisory Committee Notes. See Tome v United States, 513 US 150, 160
(1995) ("We have relied on those well-considered Notes as a useful guide in ascertaining
the meaning of the Rules. Where ... Congress did not amend the Advisory Committee's
draft in any way ... the Committee's commentary is particularly relevant in determining
the meaning of the document Congress enacted.") (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted) (second alteration in original).
Congress explicitly stated its intent that the Advisory Committee Notes to FRE 412
apply to FRE 412. See note 34. Numerous decisions considering the discoverability of
sexual history evidence - both those that allow such discovery and those that restrict it
- have cited the Notes. See, for example, Howard v Historic Tours of America, 177 FRD
48, 50-51 (D DC 1997); Sanchez v Zabihi, 166 FRD 500, 501-02 (D NM 1996). No court
has challenged the authority or reasoning of the Notes to FRE 412. In light of Congressional endorsement of the Notes, as well as their repeated reference by federal courts, it is
clear that the position of the Notes concerning discovery of sexual history testimony is
exceptionally persuasive authority.
FRE 412 Advisory Committee Notes.
' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(bX1) states that "[plarties may obtain discovery
of any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action .... The information sought need not be admissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence." FRCP 26(bXl). "Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FRE 401.
The Supreme Court long ago accorded a liberal interpretation to the relevancy
requirement. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc v Sanders, 437 US 340, 351 (1978) ("The key
phrase in this definition - 'relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action'
- has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably
could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.")
(emphasis added). See also Hickman v Taylor, 329 US 495 (1947), wherein the Court acknowledged that "[d]iscovery concededly may work to the disadvantage as well as to the
advantage of individual plaintiffs.... [D]eposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a
broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition'
serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case." Id
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In order not to undermine the rationale of Rule 412, [ ]
courts should enter appropriate orders ... to protect the

victim against unwarranted inquiries and to ensure confidentiality. Courts should presumptively [bar] discovery
unless the party seeking discovery ...

show[s] that the

evidence sought to be discovered would be relevant under
the facts and theories of the particular case, and cannot be
obtained except through discovery."
Juxtaposed against each other in the Notes, these two imperatives seem contradictory almost to the point of being incoherent.
One states flatly that FRE 412 is inapplicable to discovery, but
the other establishes a rebuttable presumption that FRE 412's
protections trump the broad discovery mandate of FRCP 26(b)(1).
Essentially, the Notes suggest that courts should balance principles of broad discovery with protection of the victim's dignity and
privacy, within the framework of a very vague standard.
Taken at face value, the Notes' recommendation that courts
allow discovery of sexual history evidence that is relevant and not
otherwise obtainable" seriously weakens the protection of Rule
at 507. However, the Court in Hickman did recognize that "discovery, like all matters of
procedure, has ultimate and necessary boundaries." Id.
Thus, on its own initiative or upon the motion of a party, the court may restrict
discovery that is "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative" or that is more conveniently
available from some other source. FRCP 26(bX2). Upon the motion either of a party to the
suit or of the individual subject to discovery, the court may restrict or prohibit discovery in
a number of ways "to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden." FRCP 26(c). An attorney making a discovery request must certify
that it is not made for purposes of harassment. FRCP 26(g)(2).
Discovery may take several forms including interrogatories (written questions),
FRCP 33, or depositions (questions posed in person). FRCP 30. Other forms include requests for production of documents, FRCP 34; court-ordered mental and physical examinations, FRCP 35; and requests for admission, FRCP 36. Depositions are generally regarded as a superior means of fact-finding to interrogatories because they allow for followup questions and limit the opportunity for lawyer-controlled answers. Any person may be
deposed, FRCP 30(aX1), whereas only a party to the suit may be served with interrogatories. FRCP 33(a). Because opposing sides meet face-to-face, depositions are a more adversarial and confrontational means of obtaining discovery. The Rules prohibit depositions
from being conducted for purposes of annoyance or harassment, FRCP 30(dX3), although
anecdotal evidence suggests that reality does not always conform to this requirement. See,
for example, William H. Fortune, Richard H. Underwood, and Edward J. Imwinkelried,
Modern Litigation and ProfessionalResponsibility Handbook: The Limits of Zealous Advocacy § 6.7.1 at 259-60 (Little, Brown 1996); Jean M. Cary, Rambo Depositions:Controlling
an Ethical Cancer in Civil Litigation, 25 Hofstra L Rev 561, 565-72 (1996) (citing examples of abusive conduct by attorneys in depositions). If one party fails to comply with discovery, the requesting party may submit a motion to compel discovery. FRCP 37(a). Incomplete disclosure or failure to comply with a discovery order are grounds for sanctions.
FRCP 37(aX3); FRCP 37(b).
FRE 412 Advisory Committee Notes.
See note 45 and accompanying text.

528

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLEGAL FORUM [1999:

412, because the standard of relevancy in federal courts is lenient.4' However, the Notes go on to suggest that in the context of a
sexual harassment suit, although "some evidence" of the victim's
at-work sexual behavior may be relevant, "non-work place conduct will usually be irrelevant."0 The Notes thus establish a simple at-work/not-at-work paradigm as a principal method of determining whether evidence is discoverable, but the looseness of
this standard leaves courts - and defense lawyers -

substantial

room to maneuver.
Discovery practices prior to the amendment of FRE 412 do
little to clarify this uncertainty. Few reported criminal cases discuss the effect of the rape shield rule on discovery." Cases resolving discovery disputes in civil sexual harassment suits prior
to the amendment of FRE 412 are also surprisingly rare.52

" Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the detarmination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FRE 401; see also
note 46.
' FRE 412 Advisory Committee Notes.
" A comprehensive online database search revealed no such cases at the federal level
and only a handful of state cases, which do not admit any generic conclusion because
states' rape shield rules and their judicial interpretations differ from each other and from
FRE 412. For example, contrast State v Miskell, 451 A2d 383, 385-86 (NH 1982) (extending state rape shield rule, which by its plain terms applied only to admissibility, to discovery), with State v Gonzalez, 757 P2d 925, 931 (Wash 1988) (holding that state rape shield
did not apply to discovery, but that defendant could not discover names of alleged rape
victim's previous sexual partners anyway because he failed to show that the information
was material).
The paucity of discovery conflicts under the old rape shield is probably due in part
to the relative scarcity of rape cases in federal courts. See Wright and Graham, Federal
Practiceand Procedure§ 5381 at 484 (cited in note 33). Equally significant are the fundamental differences between discovery in the criminal and civil contexts. For example, in a
criminal case depositions may be taken only upon the order of a court, and only to preserve evidence, not to discover information. Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and
Procedure§ 241 at 4 (West 1980 & Supp 1999). For more on evidentiary considerations in
criminal sexual misconduct cases, see generally Clifford S. Fishman, Consent, Credibility,
and the Constitution: Evidence Relating to a Sex Offense Complainant's Past Sexual Behavior, 44 Cath U L Rev 709 (1995).
The best-known case is Priest v Rotary, 98 FRD 755 (N D Cal 1983), in which the
court applied FRE 403 and FRE 404 in denying the defendant's request to discover the
sexual harassment plaintiffs sexual history, finding "the annoyance and discomfort which
the plaintiff obviously suffered as a result of defendant's inquiries unnecessary and deplorable." Id at 761. Accord Mitchell v Hutchings, 116 FRD 481, 485 (D Utah 1987). See
also Cook v Greyhound Lines, Inc, 847 F Supp 725, 737 (D Minn 1994) (denying civil sexual assault defendant's motion to compel answer to interrogatory concerning alleged prior
date rape on the grounds that "[allthough ... Rule 412 applies only in criminal cases, the
policies it embraces logically extend to actions involving sexual assault which are prosecuted in a civil forum"); Weiss v Amoco Oil Co, 142 FRD 311, 316-17 (S D Iowa 1992)
(permitting discovery of nonparty witness's sexual history by plaintiff who brought wrongful discharge suit after being terminated for sexual harassment).
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E. The Significance of Discovery in Sexual Harassment Suits
The Advisory Committee Notes thus establish only very general standards to guide judges managing discovery in sexual harassment cases. Broad standards are often useful because they
promote flexibility.53 However, because discovery is among the
most powerful weapons in the litigator's arsenal, 4 the laxity of
standards facilitates abuse. When such a volatile issue as sex is
central to a case, the danger is especially great.
The purpose of discovery is to promote justice by facilitating
the truth-seeking process.55 But observers distinguish between
two types of discovery: informational discovery and impositional
discovery.56 Informational discovery properly serves to flesh out
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword:The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv L
Rev 22, 66 (1992) ("Standards ... are flexible and permit decisionmakers to adapt them to
changing circumstances over time."). The antithesis of standards are rules, which some
commentators endorse as promoting consistency, predictability, and judicial restraint,
among other virtues. See, for example, Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,
56 U Chi L Rev 1175, 1178-81 (1989). Perhaps it is more accurate to describe existing
sexual history discovery practice as based on neither standards nor rules, but on guidelines, which "establish firm boundaries beyond which no one may go, and [which] may
require reasons to be given publicly for any departure from the norm." Cass Sunstein,
Problems With Rules, 83 Cal L Rev 953, 966 (1995).
The purpose of this Comment is not to take sides in the ongoing debate about rules
and standards, but merely to suggest that in the context of sexual harassment cases consistency is an important goal. Other commentators have advocated the creation of new
Federal Rules of Evidence or of Procedure to reconcile the apparent tension between FRE
412 and FRCP 26. See Note, Shielding Partiesto Title VII Actions for Sexual Harassment
From the Discovery of Their Sexual History - Should Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence Be Applicable to Discovery?, 12 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol 285, 335-41
(1998) (advocating the adoption of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governing the discoverability of sexual history); Andrea A. Curcio, Rule 412 Laid Bare:A ProceduralRule That
Cannot Adequately Protect Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs From EmbarrassingExposure,
67 U Cin L Rev 125, 166-78 (1998) (suggesting more restrictive evidentiary and discovery
rules for sexual harassment cases). Rather than propose new Rules that are unlikely to be
adopted, this author advocates instead that courts should clarify and harmonize the existing Rules with current sexual harassment law.
m One commentator went so far as to analogize the array of methods of discovery to
nuclear weapons. John K. Setear, The Barristerand the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence,and Discovery Abuse, 69 BU L Rev 569, 569 (1989). In response,
Judge Easterbrook wrote that discovery is more akin to "trench warfare ... the war of
attrition." Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 BU L Rev 635, 635 (1989).
Roger S. Haydock and David F. Herr, Discovery Practice§ 1.1 at 1:4 (Little, Brown
3d ed Supp 1998). The authors identify ten major purposes of discovery, including supplementing the pleadings; promoting efficiency through the early disclosure of information; partially equalizing investigative resources; allowing limited exploration of the other
party's perception of the case; documenting evidence; determining which facts are in dispute and isolating the issues; prompting negotiated settlements; promoting fair and accurate trial presentations rather than "surmise and surprise"; providing an economical
means of resolving disputes; and promoting the use of alternative dispute resolution. Id at
1:3-4. See also Joe K. Longley and Mark L. Kincaid, Discovery and Sanctions ForDiscovery Abuse, 18 St Mary's L J 163, 165 (1986).
See, for example, Easterbrook, 69 BU L Rev at 637-39 (cited in note 54).
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the factual context of the legal dispute. However, impositional
discovery -

more commonly called discovery abuse -

is no more

than a tactical means to inflict high costs on one's adversary in
order to force an unfair settlement or withdrawal from the suit. 7
Although discovery abuse can take many forms,58 in the context of
a sexual harassment suit it typically involves hostile, aggressive
behavior59 and sharp questioning of the victim. As commentators
have noted, many defense attorneys are willing to use the discovery phase of a trial to pressure the complainant.'c
Even informational discovery may not be appropriate for all
issues in a sexual harassment suit. Litigators are trained to
"[a]sk anything and everything," in order to generate as much
information as possible. 6 Even when framed without malice, such
questions may intrude unreasonably on the plaintiff's privacy.
Sometimes the line between hectoring the victim and merely
posing aggressive questions is very thin. For example, shortly
before the amendment of FRE 412 one article in a practitioner's
journal suggested ways for defense attorneys to bring up a harassment plaintiffs sexual history in a deposition:
One way to illicit [sic] possible assertions [of chastity, in
order to be able to introduce impeaching sexual history
evidence] by plaintiff is to accuse her in the deposition of
"An impositional (excessive, abusive) discovery request is one 'justified' from the

demander's perspective not by its contribution to an anticipated judgment but by its contribution to an anticipated settlement." Id at 637.
Examples include hiding or destroying documents, supplying excessive documents
in response to a discovery request or otherwise burying relevant documents among a mass
of irrelevant ones, and stonewalling or delaying.
See, for example, Interim Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, 143 FRD 371, 386 (1991) (reporting that of lawyers who indicated
that incivility is a problem in litigation, 97 percent noted that such incivility occurs in
discovery proceedings).
Discovery abuse in general is very well documented, at least anecdotally. Stories of
discovery abuse are so widespread that they have risen almost to the level of clich6 in the
law. See generally John D. Shugrue, Identifying and CombatingDiscovery Abuse, 23 No 2
Litigation 10 (1997); Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer Tricks: An Essay on Discovery Abuse,
96 Colum L Rev 1618 (1996); Longley and Kincaid, 18 St Mary's L J 163 (cited in note 55).
Although many allegations of discovery abuse concern practices such as unnecessarily
burdensome requests or document dumping, other commentators have focused on the
antagonism and lack of civility that sometimes characterizes depositions. See, for example, Fortune, Underwood, and Imwinkelried, Modern Litigation Handbook § 6.71 (cited in
note 46); Cary, 25 Hofstra L Rev at 565-71 (cited in note 46). But see Linda S. Mullenix,
Discovery in Disarray:The Pervasive Myth of Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for
Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 Stan L Rev 1393, 1396 (1994) (disputing allegations of widespread discovery abuse); Jack B. Weinstein, What Discovery Abuse?: A Comment on John
Setear's The Barrister and the Bomb, 69 BU L Rev 649, 653--54 (1989).
Haydock and Herr, Discovery Practice§ 3.6.2 at 3:85 (cited in note 55).
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prior "questionable" or "loose" sexual conduct. One cannot
do that with no basis, but it is fair game to bring up workplace rumors, particularly if the alleged harasser was
aware of them ....

Plaintiffs sometimes react to such

questions before their counsel realizes that even simple
denials of certain conduct may permit broader examination. 2
Revealing personal details during discovery may be just as
unpleasant as revealing such secrets during the trial. As Judge
Posner noted, "being deposed is scarcely less unpleasant than
being cross-examined - indeed, often it is more unpleasant, because the examining lawyer is not inhibited by the presence of a
judge or jury who might resent hectoring tactics. The transcripts
of depositions are often very ugly documents."' If discovery is an
ugly and unpleasant process for sexual harassment plaintiffs, it
may discourage persons with legitimate sexual harassment
claims from pursuing a legal remedy. Congress amended FRE
412 to encourage victims to pursue private remedies by making
the process safer for them;' the failure to do so in discovery suggests a gap in the law.
II. THE FEDERAL COURTS AND RULE 412
The crucial question is whether federal courts are properly
balancing the conflicting mandates of broad discovery and respect
for the privacy of sexual harassment plaintiffs, as prescribed in
the Notes. To do so is no easy task. As one court confronting a
sexual history discovery dispute declared, "However difficult this
balancing of interests may be at the time ,of trial, it is substantially more difficult when made at the time of discovery and before the facts, issues, and positions of the parties have crystallized.' Similarly, as Judge Easterbrook has noted, "Discovery
presents intractable problems because it may be tagged 'excessive' only in retrospect."6

"
Richard G. Moon and Julie Boesky, Discovery Problems and Solutions in Sex Harassment Cases, 463 PLI/Lit 63, 73 (1993).
DFActivities Corp v Brown, 851 F2d 920, 923 (7th Cir 1988).
See note 43 and accompanying text.
Alberts v Wickes Lumber Co, 1995 US Dist LEXIS 3269, *1 (N D Ill).
Easterbrook, 69 BU L Rev at 636 (cited in note 54).
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A. Federal Court Opinions Balancing FRE 412 and FRCP 26
Confronted with the difficulty of preventing excessive discovery before it happens, many. courts have sought refuge in a
straightforward rule that determines the discoverability of sexual
history according to whether it occurred or was known within the
workplace. Other courts, however, have criticized this rule as
overinclusive.
1. The At-Work/Not-At-Work Rule.
Most courts resort to the comparatively simple at-work/notat-work paradigm suggested by the Advisory Committee Notes, 7
and hold that the only discoverable evidence of the plaintiff's sexual behavior or predisposition is behavior that occurred in the
workplace. In one case, for example, a policewoman sued her employer and several employees for sexual harassment." The court
allowed the defendants "reasonable leeway," ordering the plaintiff to respond to discovery requests concerning her sexual conduct at work or on duty, or with the named individual defendants.6 " However, the court barred the defendants from seeking
discovery, from either the plaintiff or any other witness, of any
information concerning the plaintiff's sexual -conduct outside
those parameters. °
Another court refused a Title VII plaintiff's request to quash
discovery of pictures of her at a party attended by a "male exotic
dancer," on the grounds that, because the pictures had been
taken to work and showed to other employees, they were probative of the plaintiffs willingness to accept a more sexualized atmosphere at work.7" The court was unreceptive to the notion that
what is embarrassing at trial may be just as humiliating when
revealed through discovery: "[P]laintiffs are confusing what is
admissible at trial ... and what is discoverable ....
have [ ] overstated the protections of Rule 412. "72

Plaintiffs

See note 50 and accompanying text. This distinction did not originate with the
Notes, at least not as a factor for determining admissibility. See, for example, Burns v

McGregor ElectronicIndustries, Inc, 989 F2d 959, 963 (8th Cir 1993) (holding that sexual
harassment plaintifrs nude appearance in a magazine distributed among her co-workers
was irrelevant to the issue of welcomeness of her employer's sexual advances).
Barta v City and County of Honolulu, 169 FRD 132 (D Hawaii 1996).

Id at 135-36.
Id at 136.
Holt v Welch Allyn, Inc, 1997 US Dist LEXIS 5896, *20-21 (N D NY).
Id at *22. The court did note that the plaintiffs were free to seek a confidentiality
order with regard to the photograph. Id at *23 n 2.
70
"
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By amending their original pleadings to portray the plaintiff
as the sexual aggressor, the defendants in Sanchez v Zabihi3
forced the plaintiff to answer an interrogatory concerning her
entire romantic and sexual history with any and all co-workers
(other than her husband) in the preceding three years - a length
of time that the court considered to be "narrowly tailored" from
the defendants' requested ten years.74 However, the court did issue explicit orders sua sponte restricting the dissemination of the
discovered information.75
2. Rejection of the At- Work /Not-At- Work Distinction.
Some courts are more circumspect and treat the at-work rule
as merely the first of several hurdles to be cleared before discovery of the plaintiff's sexual history may proceed. In Herchenroe76
der v The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory,
the court allowed the defendant to pose (only) "two precise questions" about the existence of the plaintiff's alleged sexual relationship with a co-worker, who was also a crucial witness for the
plaintiff.77 The court displayed sensitivity to the precepts of Rule
412 by mandating that the defendants pursue discovery through
written interrogatories, the "least intrusive means possible,"78
and by requiring that the parties first implement a confidentiality agreement.79
At least one court has flatly rejected the simplicity of the atwork test. In sharp contrast to the Sanchez decision, a federal
district court held in Howard v Historic Tours of America"0 that
the plaintiffs need answer only those interrogatories that concerned their sexual history with co-workers who were named defendants, and not with any other co-workers. 1 The decision
turned in part on the defendants' apparent inability to narrow
the inquiry to specific non-defendant co-workers. The court intuited that if the defendants were unaware of specific other sexual
7' 166 FRD 500 (D NM 1996).
Id at 502.
"

Id at 503. The court prohibited the defense attorney from divulging any of the

plaintiffs responses to anyone, including his client, without a further motion, a hearing on
the matter, and an order from the court. Id.

" 171 FRD 179 (D Md 1997).
77 Id at 182.
78 Id.
Id at 182-83.

177 FRD 48 (D DC 1997).
8' Id at 51-53. Although the suit was predicated on District of Columbia law, rather
than Title VII, federal rules of procedure and evidence applied because the plaintiff filed
the suit in federal court.
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relationships in the workplace, no such tacit relationship could
have colored their perception of the plaintiff's receptivity to sexual advances. s2
More radically, the court in Howard refuted the defendant's
argument that the "unwelcomeness" test in Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v Vinson 3 compelled disclosure of the plaintiffs sexual conduct with any and all fellow employees. s4 The court reasoned that even if the defendants had known of other liaisons,
such knowledge would not necessarily exculpate their behavior,
since welcoming the sexual advances of one person does not connote receptivity to those of another. 5 Undermining this seemingly progressive stance, however, the Howard court permitted
the defendants to pursue the same line of inquiry through other
means. Although the court refused to compel the plaintiffs to discuss alleged relationships with non-defendant co-workers, it did
permit the defendants to depose directly those same co-workers to
glean the same information, because it considered this method of
discovery less embarrassing to the plaintiff. 6

' Id at 51 ("If the affair was secret, it could not have affected anyone else's perception and consequential behavior.").
477 US 57, 73 (1986); see note 15 and accompanying text.
Howard, 177 FRD at 53.
85

Id at 52.

Id at 53. Permitting this end-run around the plaintiff's privacy seems inconsistent
with FRE 412 and aberrational. The Advisory Committee Notes flatly state that "[tihe
revised rule applies in all cases involving sexual misconduct without regard to whether
the alleged victim or person accused is a party to the litigation." FRE 412 Advisory Committee Notes. Indeed, most courts are willing to extend the aegis of Rule 412 to a nonparty witness, at the behest of the plaintiff or witness.
The defendant is apparently limited in his ability to invoke this protection on behalf of third parties. See Stalnaker v Kmart Corp, 1996 US Dist LEXIS 10013, "10-11 (D
Kan) (overruling defendant's objections to discovery of voluntary sexual activities of four
non-party witnesses to the extent they show defendant's willingness to persuade others to
engage in such activities; none of the witnesses had themselves objected to discovery).
In Barta v City and County of Honolulu, the defense was barred from discovering
from non-party witnesses information about the plaintiff's sexual activities. 169 FRD 132,
135-37 (D Hawaii 1996). See notes 68-70 and accompanying text. This privilege against
discovery apparently also encompasses the witnesses' own sexual histories. Burger v Litton Industries, Inc, 1995 US Dist LEXIS 11373 (S D NY). The Burger court based its decision on the Rule 412 Notes, which provide that Rule 412 "applies ... without regard to
whether the alleged victim or person accused is a party to the litigation." Id at *4 (quoting
FRE 412 Advisory Committee Notes). However, the witness at issue was neither victim
nor accused, but merely a participant in consensual sexual activities with other employees
of the defendant corporation. Id at *2, *6. Thus, Burger represents a considerable extension of Rule 412.
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B. Admissibility Under FRE 412
Given the variations in tolerance among federal courts for
permitting discovery of sexual history evidence, one naturally
looks to the evidence that courts have admitted in order to develop a posteriori standards for discovery. Unfortunately, it is
difficult to derive any clear rules from sexual history admissibility decisions.
1. ProceduralSafeguards GoverningAdmissibility.
FRE 412 prescribes no bright-line rule governing admission
of sexual history evidence, but rather a balancing test tilted in
favor of the alleged victim.87 To overcome the presumption that
sexual history is not admissible, the defendant must show that
the evidence is "otherwise admissible under these rules88 and its
probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to
any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party."9
The Rule interposes an additional burden on the defendant
in the form of procedural safeguards. At least fourteen days before trial, a defendant seeking to offer evidence under the
412(b)(2) exception must file a written motion describing the evidence and the purpose for its admission, and serve the other parties with the motion. ° The court must conduct an in camera
hearing at which the victim may contest the motion. 1 In addition,
"[t]he motion, related papers, and the record of the hearing must
be sealed and remain under seal unless the court orders otherwise." 2 Although courts may waive the 14-day requirement under
the Rule, many enforce it stringently.93
2. Admissibility Decisions in the Federal Courts.
In determining the admissibility of sexual history evidence,
most courts hew to the same at-work/not-at-work distinction ap"

See notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
Federal Rules of Evidence 401 through 404.
FRE 412(bX2).

FRE 412(c).
,

Id.
Id. See Sheffield v Hilltop Sand & Gravel Co, Inc, 895 F Supp 105, 109-10 (E D Va
1995) (excluding certain sexual history testimony as a sanction for defendant's failure to
request that its motion and supporting evidence be sealed).

See, for example, United States v Eagle, 137 F3d 1011, 1014-15 (8th Cir 1998)
(barring testimony of victim's alleged other sexual activity because the defense made its
request only six days prior to trial); United States v Rouse, 111 F3d 561, 569 (8th Cir 1997)
(denying motion to introduce victim's other sexual activity because defendant's "vague
notice" of that evidence in another pre-trial motion "fell far short" of the Rule's strict procedural requirements).
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plied to discovery disputes. The issue has arisen in several cases
where the defense alleged that the plaintiff engaged in sexual
banter in the workplace.9" Where the plaintiff alleges a hostile
work environment, and where the defense claims that the accused harasser was aware of the plaintiffs tendency to discuss
sexual matters at work, admitting evidence of such banter might
be reasonable.95 Several courts, however, deem admissible all
workplace sexual discussion, on the grounds that a plaintiff who
engages in such conduct with some co-employees welcomes, under
the standard of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson," such conduct from others - a far more disturbing conclusion. 7
The recent decision in Socks-Brunot v Hirschvogel Inc"5 challenges the presumption that evidence of workplace sexual banter
goes to the issue of welcomeness. Repudiating its prior evidentiary rulings, the district court in Socks-Brunot ordered a new
trial because defense counsel had tainted the first with "highly
prejudicial, personally invasive, and legally irrelevant evidence."99
At work, the plaintiff had discussed with office colleagues a sexual relationship with a former supervisor at another place of employment. 00 Because the defense could not show that the alleged
"
See notes 95-104 and accompanying text; see also Myer-Dupuis v Thomson Newspapers, Inc, 1997 US App LEXIS 36764, *6 (6th Cir) (unpublished disposition) (affirming
admission of evidence of plaintiffs workplace sexual banter in sexual harassment claim).
" Admitting such evidence would be unreasonable in a quid pro quo situation. Engaging in sexually explicit banter may invite such banter in return, but does not indicate a
willingness to have the terms of one's employment suddenly predicated on submitting to
sexual advances. Admitting this evidence would also be unreasonable in extreme manifestations of a hostile work environment. Compare Sublette v The Glidden Co, 1998 US Dist
LEXIS 15692, *4-5, *11-12 (E D Pa) (admitting evidence of the plaintiffs extensive workplace sexual conduct, including that she not only engaged in sexual banter but also exhibited her cleavage and fondled male co-workers, because the plaintiff -[did] not allege that
either of her harassers touched her"), with Cacciavillano v Ruscello, Inc, 1996 US Dist
LEXIS 16528, *4-5 (E D Pa) (excluding evidence of plaintiff's workplace sexual banter
because "participation in sexual banter and antics has a much more tenuous relevance to
the welcomeness of touching, grabbing, flashing, and poor treatment").
' 477 US 57 (1986); see note 16 and accompanying text.
"
Citing Meritor as authority, one court held that evidence of a plaintiff's nonworkplace sexual experiences, which she discussed with some co-workers "is highly probative of how little Plaintiff would be offended by [the alleged harasser's] alleged sexual
innuendos when she in fact felt comfortable publicizing information regarding her sex
life." Fedio v Circuit City Stores, Inc, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 21144, *17-18 (E D Pa). This
holding led one law firm, writing for a practitioner's journal, to advise employers that
"[wihile you may not want to harshly discipline an otherwise good employee simply because she made comments in the workplace similar to those made by Fedio, you may want
to keep track of them in case they might come in handy later." Jack, Lyon & Jones, PA,
Judge Allows Evidence of ComplainingEmployee's Previous Sexual Behavior, 4 No 6 Ark
Emp L Letter 7 (1999).
184 FRD 113 (S D Ohio 1999).
Id at 120.
10 Id.
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harasser had ever heard the stories, the evidence was unquestionably inadmissible. 10 1 For the same reason, the court excluded
evidence that the plaintiff had graphic conversations with a coworker about oral sex:
No testimony was elicited to indicate that [the alleged
harasser] was part of this conversation ....

No evidence

was offered that he ever knew of the conversation .... The
probative value of such testimony is nil, in the absence of
the discussion occurring in the presence of [the alleged
harasser]. The prejudicial effect is clear.10 2
The court flatly rejected the defendant's argument that sexual
history evidence is admissible as relevant to the issue of welcomeness,"' implicitly ruling instead that only the alleged harasser's firsthand knowledge of workplace sexual conduct could be
probative on this issue.0 4
Less controversial is the exclusion of evidence of sexual behavior that occurred outside the workplace0 5 or directly between
the alleged harasser and his accuser. In Rodriguez-Hernandez v
Miranda-Velez,0 6 the appeals court upheld the decision to exclude
evidence of the plaintiffs sexual activities outside the workplace,
and to admit evidence of the plaintiffs allegedly flirtatious behavior toward the alleged harasser.0 7 Unfortunately, few other
"' Id at 121 ("Had the Court been aware before trial that this highly prejudicial evidence offered by the defendant involved only statements made by plaintiff to co-workers
whom she never accused of sexual harassment, the evidence would have been stricken
even under the more relaxed Rule 403 standard.").
"
184 FRD at 122. The court excluded a non-party employee's testimony that the
plaintiff had acted flirtatiously toward her alleged harasser on the same grounds; the
alleged harasser failed to show that he perceived her behavior as flirtatious. Id.
Id at 119.
Id at 120-22. The Eighth Circuit reasoned similarly in upholding a trial court's
exclusion of evidence of a sexual relationship between the plaintiff and her alleged harasser, who was her ex-husband. Because the alleged sexual activity took place outside the
workplace, unbeknownst to the defendant employer, it could not have affected the employer's failure to intervene or its decision to terminate the plaintiff. Excel Corp v Bosley,
165 F3d 635, 641 (8th Cir 1999).
" The apparent exception is Gretzinger v University of Hawaii, 1998 US App LEXIS
15370 (9th Cir) (unpublished disposition). There the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's
admission of evidence of an alleged sexual misconduct victim's lesbianism, extramarital
affair, and alleged sexual assault, because the victim claimed to suffer Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder from the alleged harassment. Id at *4-6.
132 F3d 848 (1st Cir 1998).
107 Id at 856. What is more confusing is the court's decision upholding the inclusion of
evidence that the plaintiff's outside relationship with a married man distracted her from
her work, causing the alleged lapses that were the putative reason for her termination.
See id. This reasoning is specious. If the plaintiff did in fact fail to perform her duties at
work, it should suffice to prove that point directly (for example, by showing that she
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admissibility cases have been reported and thus it is difficult to
derive a clearer standard for discovery.0 °

C. Emotional Distress Claims
When the plaintiff claims that she suffered emotional distress as a result of sexual harassment, a court will generally allow more liberal discovery of her sexual history. Although the
Supreme Court held in Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc, °9 that serious psychological injury is not a prerequisite to a sexual harassment suit,110 many sexual harassment plaintiffs plead emotional
distress in order to augment their damages claim. The default
remedy for sexual harassment is equitable relief such as back
pay, lost wages, or restoration of employment.1 ' Further, because
punitive damages may be awarded only upon a showing that the
employer acted "with malice or with reckless indifference,"1
courts rarely award them."' Accordingly, plaintiffs have strong
incentives to request damages for emotional distress.
The danger to the plaintiff is that by pleading emotional distress she may expose herself to discovery inquiries that would
otherwise be blocked under the balancing test. Early decisions
missed meetings or failed to make deadlines), without reference to the external source of
her distraction.
" A comprehensive online database search disclosed only eleven reported dispositions of admissibility disputes in civil sexual misconduct cases that considered the applicability of amended FRE 412 at any length. In addition to the cases discussed in notes 94107 and accompanying text, see also Janopoulos v Harvey L. Walner & Associates, 1995
US Dist LEXIS 2751, *3-4 (N D Ill) (holding that Rule 412 did not bar the admission of
plaintiff's marital history in a sexual harassment suit, but that Rules 401 and 402 did);
Sheffield v Hilltop Sand & Gravel Co, Inc, 895 F Supp 105, 109 (E D Va 1995) (allowing
alleged harasser to testify about the plaintiff's "sexually provocative discussions and activities in the workplace" but barring similar testimony from other employees as a sanction for noncompliance with Rule 412(c) procedural requirements). In addition, the court
in McCleland v Montgomery Ward & Co, 1995 US Dist LEXIS 14012 (N D Ill), admitted
evidence of the plaintiffs prior childhood abuse, including sexual abuse; the court ruled
that the defendant "[did] not proffer plaintiffs' childhood abuse to prove sexual behavior or
predisposition." Id at *6 n 1. Yet FRE 412 bars evidence that the victim "engaged in other
sexual behavior." FRE 412(aXl). Enduring sexual abuse is unquestionably a form of sexual behavior, however passive and involuntary. Thus, the McCleland court's ruling is
confusing, even disturbing. Its logic would appear to protect voluntary participants in sex,
but not unwilling victims. However, the court stated that it would have admitted the
evidence anyway under Rule 412(bX2). Id.
510 US 17 (1993).
11

Id at 21-22.

. 42 USC § 1981a(a)-(b) (1994).
112 42 USC § 1981a(bXl).
3
Some plaintiffs do win punitive damage awards, however uncommonly. See Fedio v
Circuit City Stores, Inc, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 21144, *7, *10-11 (E D Pa) (upholding jury's
award of $15,000 in punitive damages in a Title VII retaliation case because the jury
found sufficient evidence of malicious or reckless behavior).
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held that by claiming emotional distress or mental anguish, the
plaintiff automatically placed her mental and physical condition
in controversy, leaving her vulnerable to a range of discovery inquiries, including compelled examinations under FRCP 35.114
Some recent cases have adopted a "reasonable person" standard,
holding that an ordinary emotional distress claim does not place
the plaintiffs psychological health in controversy if a reasonable
person would have suffered such distress under identical circumstances.11 However, when a plaintiff fails to proffer corroborating
testimony of more serious impairment, courts are unlikely to
award "more than nominal damages ... for mental anguish."11
The plaintiff must therefore choose between forsaking potentially
substantial damages, and presenting evidence of significant psychological harm that may open a line of inquiry into her sexual
behavior for the defendant to pursue.
Advancing claims alleging similar types of injuries, such as
sexual dysfunction, may impinge a plaintiff's ability to avoid intrusive discovery requests. In a civil sexual assault case decided
only three and a half months after Rule 412 went into effect, the
magistrate judge confronted the "balancing test" imposed by the
conflicting mandates of FRCP 26(b)(1) and FRE 412.117 The court
upheld the plaintiff's refusal to answer certain deposition questions involving her use of birth control at the time of the alleged
assault,1 but did require her to answer other sex-related questions to resolve specific variances in the testimony."' In particular, the court directed the plaintiff to answer a question concern114

Zabkowicz v West Bend Co, 585 F Supp 635, 636 (E D Wis 1984).

See Truong v Smith, 183 FRD 273, 275-76 (D Colo 1998) ("The mere filing of a
lawsuit alleging emotional harm, without a separate claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and without a damages claim of severe and emotionally devastating harm
does not put her emotional condition at issue."); Burrell v Crown Central Petroleum, Inc,
177 FRD 376, 380 (E D Tex 1997) ("Asking for mental anguish damages does not place a
plaintiffs physical or medical condition 'in controversy.'); Lahr v Fulbright & Jaworski,
LLP, 164 FRD 204, 210 n 2 (N D Tex 1996) (distinguishing intentional infliction of emotional distress from 'garden variety claim[s] of emotional distress'). But see Hertenstein v
Kimberly Home Health Care, Inc, 1999 US Dist LEXIS 9258, *7, *18 (D Kan) (granting
defendant's FRCP 35(a) motion and declining to limit inquiry into private, non-workrelated sexual activities, although the plaintiff only alleged emotional distress and mental
anguish).
11. Burrell, 177 FRD at 382, citing Patterson v P.H.P. Healthcare Corp, 90 F3d 927,
938 (5th Cir 1996). But see Farpella-Crosbyv Horizon Health Care, 97 F3d 803 (5th Cir
1996) (upholding jury award of $7,500 in compensatory damages to sexual harassment
plaintiff whose own testimony was sufficient to allow the jury to infer that she experienced
stress and humiliation).
"'
Alberts v Wickes Lumber Co, 1995 US Dist LEXIS 3269, *3 (N D Ill).
Id at *6-7.
"'
Id at *11-13.
'
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ing the difficulties with sexual intimacy she claimed to experience
after the assault. Because the plaintiff had made those difficulties a cornerstone of her damages claim, the court held that the
defendant had a right to challenge her on that matter.12 °
Until a consensus develops that a simple emotional distress
claim does not automatically place the plaintiff's mental state in
jeopardy, courts may allow discovery of a plaintiff's sexual history
on the grounds that the defendant has the right to seek potential
alternative stressors in the plaintiffs past.'2 ' This is particularly
likely if the plaintiff alleges sexual dysfunction as a result of the
harassment. Although the plaintiff may be able to exclude such
evidence at trial by arguing that the specific evidence fails to
surmount FRE 412(b)(2)'s presumption against admissibility,'22
the defendant will likely convince the judge that the need to develop the factual record requires the discovery of such evidence.
Accordingly, sexual harassment plaintiffs who are sensitive to
invasive discovery requests should be very cautious about alleging emotional distress.
III. COURTS SHOULD RECONSIDER THEIR APPROACH TO
DISCOVERY OF SEXUAL HISTORY

The plain text of FRE 412 says nothing about discovery. Setting aside the admonition in the Advisory Committee Notes that
FRE 412 should influence courts' application of FRCP 26, it is
wholly plausible that the two rules could operate entirely independently of each other. Although a close nexus exists between
discovery of evidence and its presentation at trial, the two functions are still discrete components of the litigation process. Discovery of sexual history evidence cannot possibly prejudice the
jury if the judge adheres to the standards of FRE 412 and excludes that which is improper. Rather than make uncertain estimates of what the victim might reveal, the judge may more readily apply the proper standard with the disputed evidence at
"' Although the victim's dignity may be bruised in a blunt
hand. 23
deposition, she will be spared public humiliation. She may request that the deposition be sealed, and can expect her lawyer
Id at *12-14.
See Hertenstein, 1999 US Dist LEXIS 9258 at *18 ("Inquiries about private, nonwork-related sexual activity appear relevant to evaluate the cause and extent of psychological injuries alleged by plaintiff.").
121

'

12

See note 38 and accompanying text.
See notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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judge to control the use of embarrassing evidence at
and the
24
trial.

1

Nevertheless, although broad discovery may be consonant
with the statute's plain meaning," it is inconsistent with the Advisory Committee Notes, which were adopted by the Conference
Report accompanying Public Law 103-322,126 and printed as a
supplement to FRE 412 in the United States Code. The Notes
admonish that "[i]n order not to undermine the rationale of Rule
412, [ ] courts should enter appropriate orders pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c) to protect the victim against unwarranted inquiries."'27 Limiting discovery in this fashion best suits sexual
harassment policy goals, and reduces the incidence of distracting
elements at the trial.
A. Failing to Prevent Discovery Abuse Will Subvert The Public
Policy Goals Underlying Rule 412
Congress expanded the damages remedy under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 to prompt victims to adjudicate their claims
within the legal system. 24 Although the number of sexual harassment complaints filed at the EEOC has increased significantly
over the past two decades,"2 evidence suggests that only a small
percentage of harassment victims ever bring suit. 3 ° As the Advisory Committee Notes recognized:
[T]he wish to encourage victims to come forward when
they have been sexually molested do[es] not disappear because the context has shifted from a criminal prosecution
to a claim for damages or injunctive relief. There is a
strong social policy in not only punishing those who en-

' According to this line of reasoning, just as it may be uncomfortable but necessary
to discuss intimate details with one's doctor or psychologist, so too in a civil sexual harassment lawsuit should necessity prevail. The incentive created by the newly available
damage remedies may also soften the sting of revealing intimate details in a closed forum.
" [T]he primary rule of statutory construction [is that] a statute's plain meaning
should be given priority in its construction." Western Union Telegraph Co v FCC, 665 F2d
1126, 1137 (DC Cir 1981). Justice Scalia has observed that "[a] text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably,
to contain all that it fairly means." Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:Federal
Courts and the Law 23 (Princeton 1997).
IU

See note 34.

FRE 412 Advisory Committee Notes.
'

13

See note 23 and accompanying text.

See note 24.
See Note, 48 Vand L Rev at 1158-59 (cited in note 29).
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gage in sexual misconduct, but in also providing relief to
the victim.131
To encourage sexual harassment victims to come forward by offering the assurance that the process will not expose irrelevant
details of their intimate lives during the trial, only to allow defendants to expose those same details during discovery, would be
figuratively to yank the rug out from under the victims' feet and
subvert the very process intended to ensure their rights. Judges
must manage the discovery process so that the victim's reasonable expectations of privacy are not destroyed.
There will likely always be some unscrupulous attorneys
willing to use discovery as a means of intimidation. The law
should not be structured in a way that affords them an unfair
advantage.132 Courts should move to protect sexual harassment
victims during discovery because, as this Comment will demonstrate, they can do so at almost no cost to defendants who do not
seek to employ unfair tactics.
B. Discovery of a Victim's Sexual History Is Almost Always Unnecessary under Existing Defenses to a Sexual
Harassment Lawsuit
An employer essentially has two defenses to a charge of sexual harassment: (1) that there was no sexual harassment because
the conduct was not unwelcome; 33 or (2) that although sexual
harassment may have occurred, the employer has an affirmative

13

FRE 412 Advisory Committee Notes.
See Oliver W. Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 Harv L Rev 457, 459 (1897):

If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge
enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of
conscience.
" See MeritorSavings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 69 (1986), in which the Court
held that:
[Tihe fact that sex-related conduct was "voluntary," in the sense that the
complainant was not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII. The gravamen
of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were
"unwelcome."
In the context of quid pro quo suits, the unwelcomeness requirement clearly excludes
consensual "office romances"; for hostile environment claims, the requirement suggests
that the alleged victim did not by her own behavior indicate her receptivity to the complained-of conduct.
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defense under Burliigton Industries v Ellerth"3 and Faragherv
City of Boca Raton.'35 Under neither defense is it necessary to
discover unknown facts about the plaintiff's sexual history.
If the employer's defense is that the complained-of conduct
was not unwelcome, the employer need not embark on a fishing
expedition for sexual details from the plaintiff's past. In the case
of a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, it should suffice for a
defendant to discover specific facts about the plaintiff's relationship with the alleged harasser, including facts concerning their
sexual relationship; for example, in what ways did she manifest
her consent to the conduct?13 Much of this information the defendant employer should be able to obtain from the alleged harasser,
and need only seek corroboration or denial from the plaintiff. Any
other sexual history information simply does not go to the issue of
the plaintiffs consent to the conduct.
Similarly, when the plaintiff complains of hostile work environment sexual harassment, her own workplace conduct, including her dress and type of speech, is highly relevant to the question of whether the conduct was welcome or whether in fact it
rose to the level of a hostile work environment under Meritor.37
To establish such a defense, the employer may readily query the
plaintiffs fellow employees about the nature of the plaintiff's
workplace demeanor, but should not be permitted to question her
about sexual behavior that took place out of the full view of her
fellow employees, such as a private sexual relationship with a
fellow employee. It is fatuous to suggest that a plaintiffs workplace demeanor could be sufficiently brazen to excuse the highly
sexualized atmosphere that constitutes a hostile work environment,138 yet be so unknown to the employer that discovery would
be required to learn more about it.
4

118 S Ct 2257, 2270 (1998).

118 S Ct 2275, 2292-93 (1998).
No statute or court has impinged the defendant's right to discover any sexual history between the alleged offender and victim, and this Comment does not advocate curtailing that right.
477 US at 68-69 (see note 16 and accompanying text).
The Supreme Court recently held that commonplace social intercourse between
men and women, including simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents,
unless extremely serious, does not constitute sexual harassment. Faragher,118 S Ct at
2283. Because such behavior by the alleged harasser does not support a prima facie case of
sexual harassment, neither should like conduct by the alleged victim (such as telling the
occasional off-color joke) excuse genuine sexual harassment. For the plaintiffs workplace
conduct to signal that the harasser's "extreme" behavior, see id at 2284, was not unwelcome, she presumably would have to engage in similar extreme behavior herself, which
her fellow non-party employees could not fail to notice. In such circumstances, the defendant employer may question those own employees at less cost to both itself and the plain-
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More importantly, the Supreme Court has recently signaled a
shift in sexual harassment law that emphasizes the responsibility
of the employer to establish a reasonable system to prevent and
correct incidents of sexual harassment, and on the employee to
take advantage of that system."l 9 A defendant may mount a successful defense by focusing on the behavior of the plaintiff at the
time the alleged harassment occurred, and not on such issues as
whether she slept with a coworker in the previous three years,
had an abortion, or suffered molestation as a child. This defense
properly shows the way out from the traditional preoccupation
with the victim's sexual behavior, and focuses instead on the responsible steps both victim and employer can take to reduce the
problem of sexual harassment.
Congress indicated no precise intent as to how FRE 412
should constrain discovery; rather, it left this application to the
courts. When courts are thus invited to make common law, they
should perform this duty in a reasonable and restrained
manner. 40 FRE 412 clearly defines a role for the judiciary in
shaping the outcome of the interplay of FRCP 26 and FRE 412.
Rather than resolve the tension between these two rules on a
purely ad hoc basis, courts should establish a consistent and fair
standard that upholds the purposes of FRE 412, to eliminate
prejudicial testimony and to provide an environment in which
sexual harassment victims are not discouraged from seeking a
civil remedy.
IV. A WAY FORWARD? LIMITS ON DISCOVERY OF SEXUAL HISTORY
IN CALIFORNIA STATE COURTS

California provides a model for the treatment of sexual history evidence during the pretrial phase of sexual misconduct lawtiff's dignity. Behavior that the non-party employees failed to notice, such as a discreet
affair between the plaintiff and another employee, could not possibly have colored the
harasser's perception of her receptivity to sexual advances. See Socks-Brunot v Hirschvogel Inc, 184 FRD 113, 120-22 (S D Ohio 1999); Howard v Historic Tours of America, 177

FRD 48, 52 (D DC 1997).
14

See Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher,118 S Ct at 2292-93.
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains,50 U Chi L Rev 533, 545 (1983):

If [the legislature] enacts some sort of code of rules, the code will be
taken as complete (until amended); gaps will go unfilled. If instead it
charges the court with a common law function, the court will solve new
problems as they arise, but using today's wisdom rather than conjuring
up the solutions of a legislature long prorogued.

With FRE 412, Congress has clearly invited the courts to fill the gaps.
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suits. Rather than leave the issue to unguided judicial discretion,
California's civil sexual misconduct shield141 expressly defines the
permissible scope of discovery in such cases."'
A. California's Statutory Protections
California law provides that in a sexual harassment or similar civil sexual misconduct suit, any party seeking to discover the
plaintiffs sexual history with any person other than the alleged
perpetrator must establish specific facts showing good cause,
relevancy, and the likelihood that discovery will lead to admissible evidence."4 The requisite showing must be by noticed motion,
...Cal Civ Proc Code § 2017(d) (1998). Iowa is the only other state to extend its rape
shield to civil cases. Iowa Code Ann § 668.15(1) (West 1998). Several other states limit the
admission of sexual history evidence in specific types of civil suits. Four states do so in an
action for sexual exploitation or misconduct against a psychotherapist or other mental
health professional. See ILCS ch 740, § 140/5 (West 1993); Minn Stat Ann § 148A.04 (West
1998); Tenn Code Ann § 29-26-207 (Supp 1998); Tex Civ Pract & Rem Code Ann § 81.008
(Vernon 1997). New Jersey restricts the admission of evidence about the alleged victim's
sexual history in civil actions for sexual abuse of a child. NJ Stat Ann § 2A61B-l(d)(1)
(West Supp 1998).
" Cal Civ Proc Code § 2017(d). Iowa's sexual harassment shield also extends to discovery, Iowa Code Ann § 668.15(1), but is not discussed further here because of a dearth of
case law applying it. Among the states with rape shield laws, only New Hampshire provides that the rape shield protections extend to the discovery phase. NH Rule Evid 412
(Michie 1998).
Whereas the Advisory Committee addressed the issue of discovery only tangentially
in drafting FRE 412, concern for the privacy rights of the sexual harassment victim at the
pretrial stage clearly influenced the California legislature as it drafted civil shield legislation. In section I of the bill establishing the original California civil sexual harassment
shield, the legislature declared:
The discovery of sexual aspects of complainant's [sic] lives, as well as
those of their past and current friends and acquaintances, has the clear
potential to discourage complaints and to annoy and harass litigants....
Without protection against it, individuals whose intimate lives are unjustifiably and offensively intruded upon might face the "Catch-22" of invoking their remedy only at the risk of enduring further intrusions into
details of their personal lives in discovery.
Absent extraordinary circumstances, inquiry into those areas should
not be permitted, either in discovery or at trial.
1985 Cal Stat 1328 § 1. The original civil sexual harassment shield was codified at Cal Civ
Proc Code § 2036.1; with the passage of California's Civil Discovery Act of 1986, the substance of§ 2036.1 was reenacted as § 2017(d). Mendez v Superior Court, 253 Cal Rptr 731,
735 (Cal App 1988). Although this declaration was not included in the text of this recodification, California courts continue to cite the legislative intent expressed in regard to
§ 2036.1 in cases applying § 2017(d). See id; Vinson v Superior Court, 740 P2d 404, 411
(Cal 1987).
", Cal Civ Proc Code § 2017 (d) provides:
In any civil action alleging conduct that constitutes sexual harassment,
sexual assault, or sexual battery, any party seeking discovery concerning
the plaintiff's sexual conduct with individuals other than the alleged perpetrator is required to establish specific facts showing good cause for that
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not at an ex parte hearing.'" To induce this cooperation, the court
must impose a monetary sanction against any party that unsuccessfully makes or opposes such a motion for discovery, unless the
court finds ameliorating circumstances.145
In addition, a separate California statute prohibits introduction of sexual history evidence (except for sexual conduct with the
defendant) offered to show consent by the alleged sexual harassment victim or to demonstrate absence of injury, except where
the plaintiff has pled loss of consortium as an injury or has placed
her prior sexual conduct in dispute.1 4 ' A third statute establishes
strict procedural guidelines that require written notice of intent
to introduce sexual history evidence, and provides that courts
should decide the relevancy of such evidence outside the presence
of the jury.'47 Significantly, California law affords greater protection to the sexual harassment plaintiff even though there is no
cap on damages, unlike under federal law. 4"
B. Judicial Application of the California Protections
The California Supreme Court first applied the state sexual
harassment shield in Vinson v Superior Court.4 ' Although the
court required the sexual harassment plaintiff to submit to a psy-

discovery, and that the matter sought to be discovered is relevant to the
subject matter of the action and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. This showing shall be made by noticed motion and shall not be made or considered by the court at an ex parte
hearing. This motion shall be accompanied by a declaration stating facts
showing a good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue pre-

sented by the motion.
The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Section 2023 against
any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for discovery, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction

acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the
imposition of the sanction unjust.
'"
Id. As under the Federal Rules, see FRE 37(aX2XA), the party making the motion
must certify that he attempted a good faith informal resolution of each discovery issue

with the opposing counsel.
" Id. The Iowa statute is substantively similar to the California statute except that it
fails to elaborate the procedural provisions and the requirement of sanctions. See Iowa
Code Ann § 668.15(1).
" Cal Evid Code § 1106 (West 1995).
.' Cal Evid Code § 783 (West 1995).
" In a case that attracted national attention, a California jury awarded a sexual
harassment plaintiff $50,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress and $6.9
million in punitive damages. Weeks v Baker & McKenzie, 66 FEP Cases (BNA) 581, 583
(Cal Super 1994). The court reduced the award to $3.5 million. Id at 584-85.
149

740 P2d 404 (1987).
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chological examination,15 it granted her motion to restrict all inquiries into her sexual history.'51 The court held that the plaintiffs constitutional right to privacy encompassed sexual relations
and that the defendants had failed to establish any compelling
reason to justify impinging that right.'52
In Mendez v Superior Court,"s the California Court of Appeals rejected a defendant's argument that all of a victim's workplace-related sexual conduct is subject to discovery. The court
sustained the prohibition on discovery of the plaintiffs workplace
sexual partners"M because the plaintiff agreed not to introduce
evidence of the detrimental effect of the alleged assault upon her
marriage'55 ; the court was also concerned for the privacy of third
parties. 5 ' The plaintiffs claim of emotional distress did not justify the defendants' request to seek alternative stressors in her
sexual history, because even ordinary sexual misconduct cases
invariably entail an element of emotional distress in the form of
the "outrage, shock and humiliation of the individual abused."'57
In the Mendez court's view, "because such distress is inextricably
intertwined in the cause of action,"'58 allowing a claim of emo" The plaintiff had sued for intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress and
alleged that she continued to suffer from "diminished self-esteem, reduced motivation,
sleeplessness, loss of appetite, fear, lessened ability to help others, loss of social contacts,
anxiety, mental anguish, loss of reputation, and severe emotional distress." Id at 409. The
court emphasized that its decision to order the psychological examination was "based
solely on the allegations of emotional and mental damages in this case. A simple sexual
harassment claim asking compensation for having to endure an oppressive work environment ... would not normally create a controversy regarding the plaintiff's mental state."
Id.
Id at 412.
2
Id at 410-12. Although California courts cite a federal and state constitutional
right of privacy encompassing sexual relations as one cornerstone of their sexual history
discovery rulings, see Barrenda L. v Superior Court, 76 Cal Rptr 2d 727, 730 (Cal App
1998), this right is hardly integral to a decision to afford sexual harassment victims special procedural protection.
- 253 Cal Rptr 731 (Cal App 1988).
. Id at 738-40.
" Initially the plaintiffs husband had joined her suit seeking damages for loss of
consortium, but then dropped this claim. Id at 733.
'"

The court wrote that:

Insofar as defendants seek to pry into plaintiff's sexual conduct with others, they necessarily seek to pry into the third party's sexual conduct.
While theoretically such third parties could seek to appear in this action
and oppose defendants' discovery motions, such privilege under these circumstances is meaningless; first and foremost, what is sought by defendants is the right to ferret out the existence and identity of such third
parties.
Id at 737 (citations omitted).
253 Cal Rptr at 740.
'

Id.
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tional distress to expose the plaintiff to discovery of her sexual
history would circumvent the very protections the statute intended to establish. 59
Other California cases have similarly refused to allow an
emotional distress claim to open the door to broad inquiries into
the plaintiffs sexual history. In Barrenda v Superior Court,"s° the
court cited Vinson and Mendez in its decision barring the discovery of intimate details of plaintiffs' possible abortions, sexual experiences, and molestation experiences prior to their contact with
the defendant.' The court held that the defense had failed to
demonstrate any independent proof that prior sexual activity
could have contributed to the plaintiffs' emotional distress.6 2 Another court ruled that even where the defendant's psychiatric expert testified that discovery of childhood sexual assaults was
relevant to the issues of emotional distress and adult sexual perceptions and behavior, the sexual harassment shield bars discovery." The court found that nonconsensual prior sexual activity
was just as protected as consensual prior sexual activity,'" and
that to grant the discovery request would effectively vitiate the
protection of the harassment shield.'
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
California demonstrates the feasibility of greater safeguards
to protect the sexual harassment plaintiff in discovery. While not
every aspect of California practice is suitable for federal courts,
federal courts should adopt at least the principle of defining more
clearly when sexual history evidence is discoverable. Although
judicial discretion has some legitimacy in this context - several
of the federal court decisions examined above appear to have
reached intuitively reasonable decisions"6 - clarifying the standards will nevertheless promote more consistent treatment.

'" Id at 740-41.
18 76 Cal Rptr 2d 727 (Cal App 1998). This was not a sexual harassment case, but
rather a suit by two former foster children alleging negligence by the county for allowing

ongoing sexual abuse by a member of the foster family.
11

Id at 729.

" Id at 731-32.
" Knoettgen v Superior Court, 273 Cal Rptr 636, 638 (Cal App 1990).
164

Id.

Id. The court characterized the employer's discovery request as "precisely that
which the Legislature has declared offensive, harassing, intimidating, unnecessary, unjustifiable, and deplorable." Id.
1" See notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
1
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A. Arguments For More Clearly Defined Procedural Safeguards
Federal judges should establish more clearly defined procedural safeguards to protect the victim's rights during deposition.
First, courts should adopt a per se rule that a harassment victim's sexual history, including work-related sexual history, is not
subject to the automatic disclosure requirements of FRCP
26(a)(1). It is uncertain whether this issue has arisen in litigation, but at least one practitioner's journal has suggested its applicability, stating that sexual harassment defense attorneys
should "argu[e] that undisclosed conduct should have been voluntarily disclosed as relevant to the issues in the case. At a minimum, defense counsel should argue that the name and address of
any other employee with whom the Plaintiff has engaged in any
sexually related activity of any kind be voluntarily disclosed."167
Because the discoverability of sexual history is such a closelylitigated issue, and because discretionary standards rather than
clear-cut rules govern, it would be ludicrous to sanction the plaintiff for not rushing forward to provide intimate details of her sexual life. Instead, courts should actively promote good faith attempts by the parties to agree voluntarily on the terms of discovery of sexual history."'
Second, when the defendant has a valid reason to discover
the plaintiffs sexual history, courts should preserve the essence
of the notice requirement inherent in the 14-day rule for admission of sexual history evidence under Rule 412. The purpose of
this 14-day requirement is to give the plaintiff fair notice of forthcoming inquiries. Although the Advisory Committee Notes
plainly state that these procedural requirements do not apply to
discovery, 169 courts should still rely on the principle of shielding
the witness from an interrogative ambush. For example, the
court could require some sort of noticed motion, as under the

Richard Moon, Strategiesfor Taking the Deposition of the Plaintiffand the Alleged
Harasser,503 PLI/Lit 735, 744 (1994).
" The Federal Rules now require parties moving to compel discovery to certify that
they have "in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party not making the
disclosure in an effort to secure the disclosure without court action." FRCP 37(aX2XA)
(1994). See also Cal Civ Proc Code § 2017(d) (West 1998) (requiring any party moving to
compel discovery of sexual history to append to the motion a "declaration stating facts
showing a good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the
motion"). Ideally, courts should encourage parties to come to terms at the onset of the
discovery process, rather than waiting until a discovery dispute has already occurred.
169FRE 412 Advisory Committee Notes ("The procedures set forth in subdivision (c) do
not apply to discovery of a victim's past sexual conduct or predisposition in civil cases.*).
1"
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California rules, 7 ' or exercise its prerogative to review discovery
questions about sexual history before the defendant poses them
to the plaintiff.
Third, and for similar reasons, there should be a rebuttable
presumption that defendants may discover sexual history evidence only through interrogatories, not depositions. 7 ' As one
court noted, interrogatories are the "least intrusive means" of
discovery,' and hence the most suitable for a delicate line of inquiry. Responding to a written inquiry in privacy and with the
assistance of one's attorney is simply not as invasive or upsetting
as having to answer direct and possibly contentious questions by
opposing counsel in a setting that approximates a court of law,
with the swearing of an oath, the presence of a stenographer, and
so forth.' Interrogatories also facilitate appeals to the judge
when a question appears to overstep the bounds of propriety; in a
deposition, the deponent's attorney is more limited in her ability
to intercede. While interrogatories are substantially less helpful
to opposing counsel because they lack spontaneity 74 and do not
readily admit clarifying or follow-up questions, they are much
less expensive. It is notable that in many of the contested discovery cases cited above, the typical method of discovery was an interrogatory.'75 Depositions, by contrast, are more likely to facilitate abuse, because the proceedings are adversarial by nature but
7'
lack the neutral intermediary that is the judge."
Cal Civ Proc Code § 2017(d) (West 1998); see note 144 and accompanying text.
..
1 FRCP 26 already permits parties to petition the court to order that "discovery may
be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery." FRCP 26(cX3). In sexual harassment cases, judges should issue protective orders
routinely unless there is a compelling reason not to do so.
' Herchenroederv The Johns Hopkins University Applied PhysicsLab, 171 FRD 179,
182 (D Md 1997).
"' See Sexual Conduct - Discovery Limits, 12 No 8 Fed Litigator 228, 229 (Aug 1997)
("Due to the sensitive nature of information about sexual behavior or predisposition, consideration should be given to the means of discovering it. Posing questions through written interrogatories, with answers given in writing, generally will be the least intrusive
means of discovery.").
" Fortune, Underwood, and Imwinkelried, Modern Litigation Handbook § 6.5 at 251
(cited in note 46). However, attorneys may also try to consult with their clients who are
being deposed, at least partially obviating one of the perceived differences between
"crafted" interrogatories and "spontaneous" depositions. See id § 6.7.5 at 265 ("Attorneys
can attempt to frustrate a discovery deposition by conferring with the deponent 'off the
record,' through whispers or consultations during unilaterally declared recesses. The
discovery rules do not address the issue of consultations during depositions.") (footnote
omitted).
"' See, for example, Sanchez v Zabihi, 166 FRD 500 (D NM 1996); Howard v Historic
Tours ofAmerica, 177 FRD 48 (D DC 1997).
...Fortune, Underwood, and Imwinkelried, Modern Litigation Handbook § 6.7 at 259
(cited in note 46) ("[T]he deposition takes place in a conference room or office, out of the
'"
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Fourth, although many judges are reluctant to interfere in
the discovery process, preferring to let counsel negotiate the details themselves,177 courts should appreciate the special and sensitive nature of sexual history testimony and stand ready to play
a more active and direct supervisory role. 7 '
B. Arguments for Substantive Safeguards
Establishing that the sexual harassment victim is entitled to
all reasonable procedural safeguards does not resolve the question of when she should have to submit to sexual history questioning in the first place. Courts should distance themselves from
the at-work/not-at-work dichotomous test, propounded by the Advisory Committee Notes and endorsed by many courts and defense attorneys,'79 because it is a simplistic and overinclusive
standard. Instead, courts should favor the reasoning exemplified
in Howard v Historic Tours of America' ° and Socks-Brunot v
Hirschvogel Inc,' that sexual history evidence of the victim with
regard to co-workers other than the defendant does not pass the
balancing test in most circumstances.
The proper treatment of an emotional distress claim is more
difficult. The approach of the California courts is inapposite at
the federal level, because it is predicated on the California legislature's unambiguous intent that alleged sexual misconduct victims be protected at all phases of litigation, including discovery.8 "
Congress has made no such declaration. Nevertheless, in light of
the Supreme Court's ruling in Faragherv City of Boca Raton"
view of the public and the judge. The opportunity and incentive for unethical conduct are
great.").
177 See Kramer v Boeing Co, 126 FRD 690, 692 (D Minn 1989) ("The spirit of Rule
26(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is that discovery be self-effectuating, without
need to resort to the court, and that its scope be liberal.").
" See Easterbrook, 69 BU L Rev at 640 (cited in note 54) (suggesting that judges
taking an active role in managing discovery are more effective because "a judge can say
'Issue X will be irrelevant, don't pursue it' in a way a magistrate cannot"). But see Francis
H. Hare, Jr., James L. Gilbert, and Stuart A. Ollanik, Full Disclosure: Combating Stonewalling and Other Discovery Abuses 53 (ATLA 1994) (noting that "[clommentators dis-

agree as to whether increased judicial intervention does more to deter abuse or to increase
contentiousness and adversity").
" Moon, 503 PLI/Lit at 752 (cited in note 167) ("defendants should argue that all of
the activities in the workplace are discoverable"); Barbara Berish Brown and Patti L.
Hurst, Motions Practicein Sexual Harassment Cases, 463 PLI/Lit 149, 186 (1993) (noting
in an article outlining strategies for sexual harassment defense counsel that "[clourts
typically will admit evidence of plaintiff's sexually related conduct in the workplace").
so 177 FRD 48 (D DC 1997); see notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
...184 FRD 113 (S D Ohio 1999); see notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
"

See note 142.
118 S Ct 2275 (1998).
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that only "extreme" behavior rises to the level of actionable sexual harassment,' an objective victim is likely to experience some
level of emotional distress. Accordingly, when the plaintiff claims
ordinary mental anguish and does not seek disproportionate
damages, she should not forfeit her protection in discovery.185
CONCLUSION

By amending FRE 412, Congress took an important step toward promoting alleged sexual harassment victims' pursuit of
legal remedies. The amended Rule excludes prejudicial evidence
and makes the victim feel more comfortable with her participation in the legal proceedings, secure in the knowledge that irrelevant details of her sexual history will not be revealed at trial.
However, Congress insufficiently addressed the issue of discovery, leaving open a gap in the law which an unscrupulous attorney could exploit to intimidate the victim through forcible disclosure of her sexual history. Although many judges have suitably
wielded the considerable discretion that FRE 412 allows them in
regulating discovery of a victim's sexual history, some have not,
adhering to outmoded beliefs about appropriate social mores and
adult behavior. Consistent with their right to fill the interstices of
procedural rules, courts should establish more clear and thorough
standards to ensure that a sexual harassment plaintiff is not
harassed a second time, at her deposition.

18

See note 138.

See Farpella-Crosbyv Horizon Health Care, 97 F3d 803, 808-09 (5th Cir 1996)
(upholding jury award of $7,500 in compensatory damages to sexual harassment plaintiff
whose own testimony was sufficient to allow a jury to infer that she experienced stress
and humiliation).
"

